

'United We Stand': American Attitudes toward (Muslim) Immigration Post- September 11th

Kathleen M. Moore

*University of Connecticut
Storrs, Connecticut*

Listen here, professor. You're the one that needs an American history lesson! You don't know nothing about Lady Liberty, standing there in the harbor with her torch on high, saying 'Give me your poor, your dead-beats, your filthy.'

-Archie Bunker, All in the Family

These words, uttered by a fictional television character of the 1970s, express a certain bigoted attitude about immigrant groups in the United States during the second half of the twentieth century. Of course it comes as no surprise to anyone who has watched the series "All in the Family" that Archie Bunker should hold such a prejudice. Archie's bigotry is one of the long-standing staples of the situation comedy. In many ways, Archie is a caricature of the working class, a composite of some home-spun and sometimes reactionary popular attitudes. For example, the epigraph above points up Archie's anti-intellectualism, edgy patriotism, and intolerance toward all out-groups in general.

For the benefit of his son-in-law, Michael Stivic, Archie continues his tirade in this segment about how great America is because people of every race and nationality can "*come to this country and live in their own separate sections.*" Such guileless demonstration of an embarrassing truth brings viewers face to face with a disturbing irony. In a nation that Abraham Lincoln once said was "conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal," some persons are *less* equal than others and are 'free' as long as they confine themselves to their own kind. Perhaps the humor works here because Archie's reasoning is highly charged. Prior

knowledge of Archie's character and his often-racist assumptions can influence the viewers' 'reading' of Archie's words. We laugh nervously at Archie's wit because it plays up the contradiction between the rhetoric of equality and integration and the reality of immigrant exclusion and marginalization. While the *intent* of the American creed may be to offer sanctuary for the world's exiles and refugees, and to uphold equal treatment, the *outcome* of public policy, and of the public will, is altogether less generous. Archie's mangled verse reveals the not widely discussed secret that most people are relatively satisfied with the continuing de facto segregation of our society. It also suggests that Americans are content with the racial overtones of U.S. immigration policy.¹

Is the Demographic Revolution Coming?

Once again, elected leaders in the United States are debating major reform proposals for immigration. From the content of elite discourse found in congressional records, academic journals and the mainstream press, to its more commonplace expression in popular culture, the costs and benefits of immigration have been weighed and balanced in the scales of American public opinion. This buzz grows from the fact that most discussions of immigration, whether they are in the newspapers; Capitol Hill, or the local coffee shop, begin with the premise that current controls on immigration are failing and that something needs to be done. From the magnitude and content of the debates on this issue, the casual observer would probably conclude that the main rationale for restricting further immigration to the United States is economic.² For instance, California governor Pete Wilson based his 1994 reelection campaign on his promise to work for a constitutional amendment that would deny citizenship to the children of illegal aliens, and he enthusiastically supported Proposition 187, which would deny social benefits to illegal aliens. In the rhetoric of his election campaign the question of who can claim social benefits as a public right became a question of economics, not politics and, similarly, the question of the privatization of social welfare transformed from a moral imperative to an economic one.³

In this article, though, I explore the extent to which *non-economic* factors (such as prejudicial stereotypes) play a significant role in shaping inter-group relations and in influencing the public's willingness to accommodate present levels of immigration. Because prior research has shown that policymakers are often responsive to a combination of public attitudes and business elites on this issue,⁴ I examine current levels of public support for specific changes in immigration control. While the original survey upon which this article is based also measures attitudes toward the post-September 11th adoption of the USA Patriot Act of 2001, the anti-terrorism legislation that

will narrow civil liberties, an in-depth analysis of these data is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, by presenting data on mass attitudes toward immigration post-September 11th, I hope to help make some sense of what lies beneath the surface in immigration debates and the apparent discrepancy between intent and outcome outlined above.

I have argued elsewhere that while economic motives to restrict immigration to the United States are important, they alone are *not* sufficient in explaining the persistence of the culturally and racially disparate impact of U.S. immigration policy.⁵ Since the liberalizing reforms of immigration laws in the 1960s, the influx of immigrants from 'Third World' countries has changed the social-demographic composition of the United States. As many experts have noted, the new immigrants of the second half of the 20th century no longer hailed primarily from Europe, and, unlike their predecessors in the early part of that century, they included highly educated, urban professionals as well as displaced peasants and workers. Legal immigrants were increasingly Hispanic and Asian by the end of the 20th century.⁶ As immigrants came to be more diverse than earlier generations in terms of appearance, language, and religion, a concerted effort to curb immigration became increasingly divisive in American politics. A variety of proponents of immigration restriction introduced bills in Congress designed to control the size and composition of immigration flows into the United States, with mixed results. By 1996, Congress adopted three major pieces of federal legislation that contained provisions designed to weed out economic castoffs, terrorists and undocumented aliens from among newcomers to the United States, while at the same time purportedly ensuring immigrants' rights.⁷ The dual (and often contradictory) purpose of these laws discloses a common distrust of the foreigner and the precariousness of legal immigrants' inclusion. While the proclaimed intent of these laws is to secure the nation's borders, end poverty, and assure the integration of new immigrants into the mainstream of society, the actual content marginalizes immigrants and constricts their political rights.⁸ For this divergent and conflicting agenda to move ahead requires widespread popular support.

All of this has been felt in particular by United States persons, including citizens, permanent residents, and visitors, of Arab and South Asian descent. This has been true more than ever since the terror strikes of September 11, 2001, although earlier terrorist incidents—such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City—provoked much the same response. Unhappily, these may become a prologue to a period of increasing limits on the civil liberties of persons of Arab and South Asian descent or Muslim faith in the United States. Many newspapers reported a sharp rise in the number of hate crimes pepe-

trated against such persons since September 11th. Likewise, the airline industry's security protocol of passenger profiling has targeted several Arab and South Asian persons since the terror strikes. As air travel resumed following the September 11 attacks, several incidents were reported in which passengers of Middle Eastern origin or appearance were removed from planes.⁹ Those opposing immigration across the board (known as restrictionists) have been handed a convenient weapon in the form of public fears about Islamic fundamentalists run amok, operating freely in Western countries. Whether this translates into higher levels of public support for restrictionist immigration reform may depend on whether public officials, such as George W. Bush, succeed in convincing the public that the United States (1) is not at war with Islam but with selected terrorists, and (2) is capable of providing better and more effective immigration controls that will safeguard national security.¹⁰

Public Attitudes toward Muslims in the United States Since September 11th

To examine the attitudes of the American public toward issues of security and civil liberties since the terror strikes of September 11th, I conducted a national survey through the Center for Survey Research and Analysis at the University of Connecticut, funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation. The survey was fielded in October and November 2001, and the sample consisted of 1147 respondents over the age of eighteen. This survey provides an important update on American public attitudes not only regarding current levels of immigration to the U.S., but also regarding the civil liberties of Muslims, Arab-Americans, and South Asian-Americans in the United States. For purposes of comparison, the survey questionnaire employs a quasi-experimental approach by introducing a split sample design. This means that when asking respondents a battery of questions about whether and to what degree they would support official measures contained in the anti-terrorism legislation of 2001 to (i) monitor phones and computer terminals, (ii) restrict student visas, (iii) ethnically profile airline passengers, (iv) wiretap individuals as they move from phone to phone, and (v) loosen restrictions on police searches and seizures, the sample of respondents are split in half. Fifty percent of the respondents are asked about these measures as they would be applied generally, across the whole population of the U.S., and fifty percent are asked about these measures *as they would be specifically applied to Arab and Muslim Americans*.

A long tradition of research on public attitudes toward immigration to the United States suggests that in periods when liberal immigration policy (permitting high levels of immigration) coincide with heightened concerns

over unemployment and declining standards of living, an increasing proportion of the public becomes willing to pin the blame for economic woes on the nation's most recent immigrants.¹¹ Some scholars explain this scapegoating phenomenon as "partly a response to the tendency of politicians and labor leaders to blame foreign workers for unemployment and downward pressure on wages."¹² Yet other researchers have questioned the use of economic criteria as the primary explanation of mass attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Social factors other than economic outlook, such as prejudice, political ideology, age, sex, and level of education, have all been shown to influence American attitudes toward immigration.¹³ Here I present preliminary results from the survey that will help us explore the influence of such social factors as familiarity (otherwise known as 'direct experience') on attitudes toward immigration and certain immigrants. In other words, a hypothesis tested here is that there is an important connection between whether one is personally acquainted or familiar with immigrants and one's attitudes on immigration policy and civil liberties. The public opinion data gathered in this survey can show the extent to which such variables as direct exposure to immigrants serve to explain attitudes in a highly controversial policy domain.

Level of Immigration to the United States

When asked whether immigration to the United States should be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased, in the Oct./Nov. 2001 survey approximately one-third (33%) of the respondents thought it should be kept at its present level. Slightly more than one-half (52%) thought immigration should be decreased and only eight percent favored increasing immigration. This question has been asked in polls taken since the 1960s and has indicated a growing opposition to immigration to the United States. In 1965, the year Congress abolished the national origins quota system in immigration admissions, public opinion polls determined that only 33 percent of Americans favored decreasing the level of immigration. By 1986, that figure had risen to 49 percent. It rose further to 66 percent in 1995. If we combine the data gathered in the present study with the results of previous surveys on this issue, we can see that the responses in the present study stayed roughly within the overall trend indicated by polls taken since the 1960s (see Table 1). In other words, we can see that over the long term, Americans have been divided on the topic of immigration levels in general, with an increasing resolve to reduce rates of immigration.¹⁴

Table 1. Americans' Attitudes toward Immigration in General. Polls taken from 1964 to 2001. Gallup, CBS/NYT, and CSRA ask, 'Should immigration be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?'

	Gallup 9/6 %	Gallup 6/65 %	Gallup 3/77 %	CBS/NY 6/86 %	CBS/NY 6/93 %	Gallup 7/93 %	CBS/NY 9/94 %	Gallup 6/95 %	Gallup 7/95 %	CSRA 6/98* %	SRA 11/01** %
Present	46	39	37	35	27	27	27	24	28	45	33
Increased	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	8	8	10
Decreased	38	33	42	49	61	65	63	66	62	37	52
Don't Know	10	20	14	9	5	2	4	4	4	10	4
N (Sample)	1,611	2,534	1,550	1,618	1,363	1,002	1,161	1,005	801	800	601


Source: John S. Lapinsky, Pia Peltola, Greg Shaw & Alan Yang, 'The Polls-Trends: Immigrants and Immigration,' 61 *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1997), 360.

*Source: Kathleen M. Moore & Stephen R. Pelletier, 'Weaving New Fabric: the challenge of immigration for Muslim-Christian relations,' 10 *Islam and Christian Relations* (1999), 186.

**Source: NSF-sponsored survey conducted by Kathleen Moore, Chase Harrison & Benjamin Adams, University of Connecticut, Center for Survey Research & Analysis, 2001. Data on file with author.

The story is not much different if one asks about the level of support for specifically Arab and Muslim immigration to the United States. Curiously, in our split sample¹⁵ survey, public support for current levels of Arab and Muslim immigration (39%) is slightly higher than it is for immigration generally (34%).¹⁶ However, only three percent favor increasing Arab and Muslim immigration, compared to ten percent for immigration generally. In this survey, approximately one-half of the respondents favored decreasing immigration: 51% favored decreasing Arab and Muslim immigration while 52% favored decreasing levels of immigration in general. (See Table 2) Following the terror strikes of September 11th by approximately 6 weeks, it is noteworthy that these data remain within the margin of error of \pm 4 percent.

Table 2. Americans' Attitudes toward Arab or Muslim Immigration, November, 2001. 'Should Arab or Muslim immigration be kept at its current level, increased, or decreased?'



Familiarity with Recent Immigrants

However, the story changes when we look at the 'direct exposure' factor. In a 1998 survey conducted by the Center for Survey Research and Analysis at the University of Connecticut, we asked respondents whether they knew someone who had come to the United States as an immigrant, and then looked to see if there was a statistical significance associated with this factor. The hypothesis we were testing was whether familiarity (e.g., acquaintance) at the personal level would affect respondents' attitudes toward immigration. Our findings indicate that almost one-half (44%) of the respondents who did *not* know an immigrant personally and were asked whether immigration should be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased said they wished to see the level of immigration decreased.¹⁷ This is a slightly higher rate of opposition compared to the respondents taken as a whole (37%) (see Table 3).

Table 3. Question: "Lately, many people have been talking about immigration issues. Do you think immigration to the US should be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?"

	Total	Familiar	Not Familiar
Present Level	45%	46%	40%
Increased	8	9	5
Decreased	37	34	44
Don't Know/Refused	10	9	11
Sample Size	800	603	193

* Source: Kathleen M. Moore & Stephen R. Pelletier, "Weaving New Fabric: the challenge of immigration for Muslim-Christian relations," *10 Islam and Christian Relations* (1999), 186.

These data suggest that persons who are *not* acquainted with an immigrant at the personal level are more likely to be interested in imposing restrictionist immigration measures. What they will be looking for are policies that improve upon the current performance of border controls and a reduction in the number of entry visas granted to lawful immigrants.

To probe this familiarity or 'direct exposure' factor further, our Oct./Nov. 2001 survey included different questions about familiarity that were cross-tabulated with levels of support for immigration. Specifically, we asked whether the respondent had any relatives who were recent immigrants. Verbatim, the interviewer asked, "Now I want to ask you to think about your

friends and family and the people you know in your town, or at work or school. Do you have any relatives or family members who are recent immigrants—in other words, they have arrived in the last ten years? Yes or no?” Next the survey interviewer asked whether the respondent had any close friends who are recent immigrants. Not surprisingly, these data show that either having a family member or a close friend who had immigrated recently had a positive effect on attitudes about levels of immigration. Four in ten respondents with a relative who had recently immigrated were satisfied with the current level of immigration, and fully 22% favored increasing the level of immigration—a twelve point jump from the general level of support for increased levels of immigration (10%). Opposition to immigration varies considerably depending on whether one has relatives who immigrated: while only one-third of those with relatives among recent immigrants (34%) wanted to see the level of immigration decrease, well over one-half (57%) of those without relatives among recent immigrants want the current level of immigration to be decreased. (See Table 4)

Table 4. Question: “Lately, many people have been talking about immigration issues. Do you think immigration to the US should be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?”

	Total	Relatives	No Relatives
Present Level	33%	39%	32%
Increased	10	22	8
Decreased	52	34	57
Don't Know/Refused	4	5	4
Sample Size	800	603	193

Having a close friend who is a recent immigrant also seems to affect attitudes about immigration, although to a lesser extent. Thirty-six percent of those who report having close friends who are recent immigrants favor current immigration levels, compared to 33% of respondents who do not have close friends who are recent immigrants. While 13% of respondents *with* close friends among recent immigrants favor increasing levels of immigration, 9% *without* such friends favor increasing levels of immigration. And while 45% of the respondents having close friends who are immigrants still favor decreasing levels of immigration, 55% of those who report having *no* immigrants among their close friends support a decrease in immigration.

With the split-sample design of this questionnaire, we asked half of our sample a slightly different question. Instead of asking respondents whether they have any relatives or close friends who are recent immigrants, we asked

half of our respondents whether they have any relatives or close friends who are *Arab or Muslim immigrants* that arrived in the last ten years. This allows comparisons between attitudes regarding immigration in general, and whether familiarity with an immigrant affects attitudes on this topic, and attitudes regarding specifically Arab and Muslim immigration to the United States. It is important to note that those respondents who were asked specifically about Arab and Muslim immigration in this question about familiarity were also asked about their support for specifically Arab and Muslim immigration (i.e., “do you think Arab and Muslim immigration to the United States should be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?”) Of those who said they were related to a recent immigrant who was either Arab or Muslim, six in ten (60%) reported that they favored current levels of Arab and Muslim immigration. This represents a substantial difference from the general response rate of roughly four in ten (39%) in favor of current levels of Arab and Muslim immigration. See Table 5.

Table 5. Question: “Lately, many people have been talking about immigration issues. Do you think Arab or Muslim immigration to the US should be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?”

	Total	Arab or Muslim Relatives	No Arab or Muslim Relatives
Present Level	39%	59%	38%
Increased	3	7	3
Decreased	51	15	53
Don't Know/Refused	6	19	6
Sample Size	547	27	519

From Whence you Came?

To many observers of immigration, it may seem rational that the American public does not regard all foreign-born persons equally and some immigrants appear to be more welcome than others. As I noted in an earlier study, in polls taken since the 1980s, the American public has favored the Irish, Polish, Chinese and Koreans as immigrants to the United States, while Mexicans and Vietnamese rank somewhat less favorably, and Iranians, Haitians and Cubans are viewed negatively.¹⁸

To investigate this in a 1998 survey, we asked whether the immigration of certain groups of immigrants should be reduced or stopped altogether. We asked about certain *groups* rather than nationalities because we wanted to investigate attitudes about Muslim immigration, and this is a religious or

Afghanis				
	1998		2001	
	F	NF	R	NR
Strongly Agree			41%	56%
Mildly Agree			14	15
Mildly Disagree			12	12
Strongly Disagree			29	11
Don't Know/Refused			4	4
Sample Size			120	480

*F = Familiar (e.g. those who are acquainted with a recent immigrant)
 **NF = Not Familiar (e.g. those who are not acquainted with a recent immigrant)
 ***R = Relative (e.g., those related to a recent immigrant)
 NR = No Relative (e.g., those not related to a recent immigrant)

However, once indicators of familiarity are factored in, support for reducing or stopping the named types of immigration goes down. For instance, Table 6 illustrates that only three in ten respondents having relatives who are recent immigrants to the United States would support restrictions on further immigration of Mexicans (compared to 50% of the total population). Similarly, only 43% of those with family members who had immigrated recently would support placing a cap on further Muslim immigration (compared to 50% of the total population). Just more than half (55%) of respondents with family members among recent immigrants thought that Iraqi immigration should be reduced or stopped, which is a full 10% less than the general population (65%). Having not a family member but a close friend among recent immigrants also tempers anti-immigrant sentiments regarding these types of immigrants, albeit to a lesser extent. Fewer than five in ten respondents (44%) having a close friend who is an immigrant favored restricting Mexican immigration. Having a close friend does not seem to affect attitudes about Muslim immigration (50% favor reducing or stopping this type of immigrant) and Afghani immigration (63% favor reducing or stopping this type of immigrant). In sum, it seems that familiarity, and in particular blood ties, with (an) immigrant(s) affects attitudes toward U.S. immigration policy.

Familiarity with Arab and Muslim Immigrants

Even as this survey offers evidence that having a family member or a close friend among recent immigrants to the United States tempers the anti-immigrant sentiment of the general public, the study also documents for the first time the extent to which those who are friends with or are related to a

recent *Arab or Muslim immigrant* harbor strong restrictionist attitudes toward other out-groups. Indeed, despite their shared fate of marginalization, the truth is that those with relatives who are recent immigrants from the Arab or Muslim worlds are much *more* likely than the general public to agree to stop or reduce Mexican immigration to the United States. More than *seven in ten* respondents having a relative who is a recent Arab or Muslim immigrant would like to see Mexican immigration restricted. Only five in ten of the general public, and three in ten respondents having a relative who is a recent immigrant from anywhere (e.g., the country of origin was unspecified in the question), felt that Mexican immigration ought to be reduced or stopped. These figures are provocative. Though general perceptions of Mexican and Muslim immigration to the United States are roughly equal (50% and 51% of Americans, respectively, would support restriction of these types of immigration), those *related* to Arab and Muslim immigrants harbor strong anti-Mexican restrictionist attitudes. This survey offers some evidence that the general public's perception of Mexican immigration has improved between 1998 and 2001: support for restriction of this type of immigration has dropped from 57% to 50% in three years. At the same time, the general public's perception of Muslim immigration has worsened: support for restricting Muslim immigration has risen slightly from 46% in 1998 to 51% in 2001. There may be a causal connection here. For instance, as Mexican immigrants' circumstances have improved, perhaps relatives of Arab/Muslim immigrants feel more vulnerable, seeing the competition over resources and a positive reception as a zero-sum proposition. As Mexican immigrants earn more esteem in the public eye, Arab/Muslim immigrants suffer a corresponding loss.

If we can assume that *relatives* of recent Arab or Muslim immigrants are Arab or Muslim *themselves*, then we have a pretty good proxy for Arab/Muslim attitudes in the United States. Consider the following responses. In 2001, Muslim and Arabs (represented here by relatives of recent Arab and Muslim immigrants in the United States) were less likely to want to restrict Afghani immigration than the general public (41% and 63%, respectively). Fewer than four in ten Arab/Muslim respondents supported restrictions on further Iraqi immigration to the United States (34%), a lower opposition rate than found among the general public (65%). On the other hand, 41% of Arab/Muslim respondents felt that English-speaking Canadian immigration ought to be reduced or stopped, compared to 27% of the general public. General support for restricting Muslim immigration was 51%. Yet, slightly more than two in ten Arab/Muslim respondents (23%) supported the same restrictions. One needs to use caution when considering these statistics, however, since we are basing them on small numbers. Only 5% of our

sample reported having any relatives who are recent Arab or Muslim immigrants. Yet these numbers point in a challenging direction and bear out the need for further investigation. It appears that the more diversity present in American society, the more prejudices we may have to overcome.²⁰

Once again, being able to count a recent Arab or Muslim immigrant among one's friends (as opposed to relatives) seems to have less of an impact on one's attitudes about restriction of these particular out-groups (Mexican, Afghani, Iraqi, etc.). First, it is worth pointing out that 16% of respondents report having a close friend who is a recent Arab or Muslim immigrant, which is substantially more than the 5% who report being related to a recent Arab or Muslim immigrant. Presumably, then, our findings about the effect of friendship are more reliable. The responses of those reporting an Arab or Muslim immigrant friend do not seem to differ much from those of respondents counting a close friend among recent immigrants (country of origin unspecified). For instance, when we ask about support for restricting Mexican immigration, those respondents with a close friend who is a recent Arab or Muslim immigrant do not differ at all from those with a close friend who is a recent immigrant (44%). Having a close friend who is an immigrant does not seem to affect the general public's attitudes toward Afghani immigration (63% support restricting Afghani immigration). Yet, having specifically an Arab or Muslim friend *does* moderate somewhat this restrictionist preference (54% support restriction on Afghani immigration). Keep in mind that only 41% of respondents who have relatives among recent Arab and Muslim immigrants to the United States support such restrictions.

Conclusion

The United States is now in a period of heightened concern over immigration control due to recent terrorist strikes and threats and we expect to see these debates continue. As shown above, public attitudes about immigration to the United States as a whole are fairly negative, yet people who can count an immigrant among their friends and family are comparatively satisfied with current levels of immigration. Why the misgivings about immigration? The lack of knowledge or familiarity with recent immigrants is a significant factor. Variables such as direct exposure to immigrants in the United States appear to temper an anti-immigrant backlash. It is clear that being able to count *relatives* among recent immigrants, whether Arab/Muslim or not, is a strong indicator of positive attitudes toward immigration. The obvious lesson we can draw from this data is that inter-group relations will benefit from an increase in opportunities for positive interactions across ethnic and religious boundaries.

Few nations project a public image in both domestic and world affairs so self-consciously open to immigration and diversity in its iconography, symbolism, and rhetoric (for example, *e pluribus unum* appears on the dollar bill). Thus, while a school child from Pakistan (for example) may be uncertain about whether to identify certain countries of Europe or South America as open-handed, it is entirely likely such a child will readily identify the United States with the Statue of Liberty. That this association is misguided is not my point. How to connect this usual association with the incongruity of American sentiment on immigration, however, remains a challenge.

Table 7. Perceptions of Immigrant Groups by Familiarity
Question: 'It is sometimes said that immigration from certain countries or regions of the world should be strictly regulated or halted altogether. For each of the following groups please tell me whether you agree or disagree that their immigration to the US should be reduced or stopped.'

		Iraqis			
		1998		2001	
	F*	NF**	F	NF	
Strongly Agree	44%	58%	44%	56%	
Mildly Agree	15	10	18	15	
Mildly Disagree	17	13	16	9	
Strongly Disagree	17	10	21	15	
Don't Know/Refused	6	9	2	3	
Sample Size	603	193	141	460	
		Mexicans			
		1998		2001	
	F	NF	F	NF	
Strongly Agree	30%	44%	22%	31%	
Mildly Agree	23	24	22	18	
Mildly Disagree	19	18	19	24	
Strongly Disagree	22	8	36	23	
Don't Know/Refused	6	7	1	2	
Sample Size	603	193	141	460	
		Muslims			
		1998		2001	
	F	NF	F	NF	
Strongly Agree	25%	37%	32%	31%	
Mildly Agree	18	19	18	17	
Mildly Disagree	25	19	21	18	
Strongly Disagree	24	16	24	25	
Don't Know/Refused	8	9	42	45	
Sample Size	603	193	141	460	

Irish				
	1998		2001	
	F	NF	F	NF
Strongly Agree	7%	10%	8%	12%
Mildly Agree	18	20	23	13
Mildly Disagree	32	34	24	24
Strongly Disagree	26	23	42	45
Don't Know/Refused	6	13	4	4
Sample Size	603	193	141	460

Canadians				
	1998		2001	
	F	NF	F	NF
Strongly Agree	7%	11%	7%	10%
Mildly Agree	16	22	16	16
Mildly Disagree	28	27	22	22
Strongly Disagree	44	33	53	46
Don't Know/Refused	5	7	2	3
Sample Size	603	193	603	193

Afghanis				
	1998		2001	
	F	NF	F	NF
Strongly Agree			45%	56%
Mildly Agree			17	14
Mildly Disagree			14	11
Strongly Disagree			19	13
Don't Know/Refused			4	4
Sample Size			120	480

*F = Familiar
**NF = Not Familiar

Endnotes

1. John F. Kennedy offers an interesting indictment of this in his book, *A Nation of Immigrants*. Kennedy writes, "[t]he famous words of Emma Lazarus on the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty read: 'Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.' Until 1921 [and the adoption of the national origins quota system], this was an accurate picture of our society. Under present law it would be appropriate to add: 'as long as they come from Northern Europe, are not too tired or too poor or slightly ill, never stole a loaf of bread, never joined any questionable organization, and can document their activities for the past two years.'" (Copyright 1964 by Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith) (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1964), 24.

2. Peter Burns and James G. Gimpel, "Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 115 no. 2 (Summer 2000), 201-25. See also Kitty Calavita, "The New Politics of Immigration:

'Balanced Budget Conservatism' and the Symbolism of Proposition 187," *Social Problems* 43 (1996), 284-305; J. D. Citrin, C. Muste, and C. Wong, "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations," in *Journal of Politics* 59(1997): 858-81; Thomas Espenshade, J. Baraka, and G. A. Huber, "Immigration Reform, Welfare Reform, and Future Patterns of U.S. Immigration," in *In Defense of the Alien*, v. 20 (New York: Center for Migration Studies); George J. Borjas, *Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Gregory A. Huber and Thomas J. Espenshade, "Neo-isolationism, Balanced-Budget Conservatism and the Fiscal Impacts of Immigrants," *International Migration Review* 31 (Winter 1997), 1031-54; and Steven Camarota, "The Effect of Immigrants on the Earnings of Law-skilled Native Workers: Evidence from the June 1991 Current Population Survey," *Social Science Quarterly* 78 (June 1997), 417-31.

3. For a discussion of the "alien" as a threat in contemporary politics, see Evan Watkins, *Everyday Exchanges: Marketwork and Capitalist Common Sense* (Stanford University Press, 1998), especially 48-55. See also Philip G. Schrag, *A Well-Founded Fear: The Congressional Battle to Save Political Asylum in America* (New York: Routledge, 2000), especially 53-54.

4. See Joe Feagin, "Old Poison in New Bottles: The Deep Roots of Modern Nativism," in *Immigrants Out! The New Nativism and the Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United States*, ed. J. F. Perea (New York: NYU Press, 1997); J.G. Gimpel and J.R. Edwards, Jr., *The Congressional Politics of Immigration Reform* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999); A.T. Fragomen, "The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996: An Overview," in *International Migration Review* 31 (Summer 1997): 438-60; K. Calavita, "The New Politics of Immigration: 'Balanced Budget Conservatism' and the Symbolism of Proposition 187," in *Social Problems* 43 (August 1996): 17-47.

5. Kathleen M. Moore, "U.S. Immigration Reform and the Meaning of Responsibility," *Studies in Law, Politics and Society* 20 (2000), 125-55; and "A Closer Look at Anti-Terrorism Law: American Arab Anti Discrimination Committee v. Reno and the Construction of Aliens' Right," in *Arabs in America: Building a New Future*, ed. Michael Suleiman (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999): 84-99.

6. Frank D. Bean, Robert G. Cushing, Charles W. Haynes and Jennifer V.W. Van Hook, "Immigration and the Social Contract," *Social Science Quarterly* 78 (1997); and National Research Council, *The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration* (New York, National Academic Press, 1997).

7. These laws are the welfare reform act of 1996, known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act; the immigration reform act of 1996, known as the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act; and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

8. For an analysis of this phenomenon in another advanced capitalist country, see Kitty Calavita, "Immigration, Law, and Marginalization in a Global Economy: Notes from Spain," *Law and Society Review* 32 no 3 (1998), 529-66.

9. Two Sikh organizations report they've received complaints that airport security personnel are asking Sikh men to remove their turbans at security checkpoints. That is distressing for Sikhs because wearing a turban is an important part of being religiously observant. The removal of the turban is highly intrusive, according to a spokesman for the Sikh Communications Council (See *The Times-Picayune* [New Orleans] November 5, 2001, METRO section, p. 4, "Turban Turmoil"). In a separate instance, Rep. Darrell E. Issa (R-Vista, Calif.), the grandson of Lebanese immigrants, said he was the victim of racial profiling after being prevented from boarding a flight to the Middle East. Mr. Issa said that when he arrived at the Air France counter at Dulles International Airport in Virginia on Oct.

4, he was told that “for security reasons,” he couldn’t board, even after he identified himself as a congressman. He was kept from boarding because of his “Arab surname,” he said (See *Los Angeles Times*, October 27, 2001 Saturday Home Edition, Part A; Part 1; Page 13; National Desk, “Response to Terror”). See also the *Washington Post*, where the following was reported:

After a flap erupted over his offensive observation that any airline passenger wearing ‘a diaper on his head’ should be ‘pulled over’ for extra questioning by airport security personnel, Louisiana Rep. John Cooksey issued an apology. Then he went on the House floor to declare his opposition to harassment of Sikhs, Muslims and Arab Americans. Then he put together a commercial that went right back to the ugly posture of singling people out for suspicion based on appearance and ethnic background. “Recently, my words were too tough, but my beliefs are still strong,” he says in the spot that aired during the LSU-Florida game and is prominently displayed on the Web site for his 2002 Senate campaign. “We know the faces of terrorists and where they’re from. Terrorist profiling is essential for our nation’s security.”

(*Washington Post*, October 11, 2001, Thursday, Final Edition, Editorials, Pg. A32, “An Ugly Appeal”.)

10. See President George W. Bush’s speech to the joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, in which he asserted that “America is not at war with Islam.” George W. Bush, *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, September 20, 2001.

11. Jack Citrin, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste and Cara Wong, “Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations,” in *Journal of Politics* v. 59, n. 3 (1997): 858-81; Kitty Calavita, “The New Politics of Immigration: ‘Balanced Budget Conservatism’ and the Symbolism of Proposition 187,” in *Social Problems* 43 (1996): 17-47; Jeffrey S. Passel and Michael Fix, *Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1994); and Michael C. LeMay, *From Open Door to Dutch Door: An Analysis of U.S. Immigration Policy Since 1820* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1987).

12. Citrin, et al., 1997, 859.

13. Charles R. Chandler and Yung-Mei Tsai, “Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes: an Analysis of Data from the General Social Survey,” in *Social Science Journal* 38 (2001): 177-88; Peter Burns and James G. Gimpel, “Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy,” in *Political Research Quarterly* v. 115, n. 2 (2000): 201-25; James R. Barrett and David Roediger, “Inbetween Peoples: Race, Nationality and the ‘New Immigrant’ Working Class,” in *Journal of American Ethnic History* (Spring 1997): 3-44; and Thomas Espenshade and Katherine Hempstead, “Contemporary American Attitudes Toward Immigration,” in *International Migration Review* 30 (1997): 535-70.

14. See John S. Lapinski, Pia Peltola, Greg Shaw and Alan Yang, “The Polls—Trends: Immigrants and Immigration,” in *Public Opinion Quarterly* 61 (1997): 356-83, cited in Kathleen M. Moore and Stephen R. Pelletier, “Weaving New Fabric: the Challenge of Immigration for Muslim-Christian Relations,” in *Islam and Christian Muslim Relations* v. 10, n. 2 (1999): 177-96.

15. A split-sample design means that half of our respondents (600) were asked one battery of questions about immigration and civil liberties generally, while the other half (547) were asked another battery of questions that differed from the first only in that they specifically asked about Arab and Muslim immigration and civil liberties

16. With the split sample design, approximately half of the 1147 respondents were asked about immigration in general (n = 600) and the remainder were asked about Arab and Muslim immigration (n = 547). The margin of error is +/- 4%. This means that support for present levels of immigration in general ranges from 30% to 38% (34% +/- 4%) and for present levels of Arab and Muslim immigration ranges from 35% to 43% (39% +/- 4%).

17. Moore and Pelletier, 1999, 188.

18. *Ibid.*, 191.

19. *Ibid.*, 191-93.

20. For some data on this see "Taking America's Pulse: A Summary Report on the National Conference Survey on Inter-Group Relations," a Louis Harris poll (1994) and a Princeton Survey Research Associates poll (2000) commissioned by the National Conference for Community and Justice (founded in 1927 as the National Conference of Christians and Jews). These data determine how America's most populous and/or fastest growing ethnic, racial and religious groups perceived each other and the problems they share. On file at the Roper Center of the University of Connecticut.

